We examine whether FASB-mandated modifications of the consolidation rules (FIN 46 and FIN 46R) resulted in perceptible changes in market participants' decisions as manifested in a variety of financial indicia. We find that financial analysts' idiosyncratic precision of information decreased and equity market participants acted as if they perceived higher risk as evidenced by reduced earnings response coefficients for these firms after 2001. On the other hand, we find that information users that likely had access to information regarding the off-balance-sheet debt structures prior to 2001 did not exhibit a similar increase in risk assessment. Specifically, we find that banks did not increase the loan spreads for FIN 46 firms and credit rating agencies did not lower the ratings of these firms more than those of other firms. This finding is consistent with our conjecture that these entities were aware of the true risk levels of FIN 46 firms even under the prior limited disclosure regime. Overall, we conclude that the perceived risk of firms that have previously structured a part of their operations in separate entities increased significantly with the expected promulgation of accounting guidance requiring them to bring in the previously off-balance-sheet assets, liabilities and results of operations into their financial statements. We interpret these results as evidence that these firms previously were assessed as having lower risk relative to their peers within the equity market. We conclude that the anticipation of FIN 46 was instrumental in changing the behavior of market participants who previously lacked access to information expected to be provided by the implementation of FIN 46, namely equity investors and analysts.
Introduction
In this paper, we examine the empirical question of whether equity market participants and other sophisticated financial information users are sensitive to the risk inherent in corporate consolidation choices. Specifically, we ask whether FASB-mandated modifications of the consolidation rules resulted in perceptible changes in market participants' decisions as manifested in a variety of financial indicia. on a variety of metrics manifesting investment and lending decisions. In other words, we seek to assess the reaction of market participants to the revelation of such previously hidden and newly disclosed risk.
The results of such an examination would not only reveal how changed rules of consolidation and related disclosures such as those of FIN 46 affect capital markets, but may also contribute to our understanding of how mandated accounting rule changes which lead to greater disclosure of risk would be assimilated by markets in general.
The FIN 46 rule change presents a rare opportunity to compare the risk perception of market participants for the firms that are likely to be affected by the rule changes. For example, if use of VIEs leaves significant amount of debt off the balance sheet and firm risks depend on the total amount of debt employed by the company, then it is plausible to expect measures of risk for these firms to be underestimated in the pre-FIN 46 world. Once the rule is in effect, firms with consolidated VIEs would reveal their true risk levels. The impact of change in risk measures of such companies is precisely what we document in this paper.
In conducting our examination, we formulate two sets of hypotheses. The first relates to users of financial statements that are not likely to possess non-publicly available information. This group comprises primarily equity investors including information intermediaries such as financial analysts. The second set includes lending banks and debt-rating agencies. The latter group is likely to have access to superior information as a result of their privileged access to company information and their right to demand such information as a condition for lending or rating. While we expect FIN 46 to impact the decisions of the first set of users, we predict little or no impact on decisions of lending banks and rating agencies by virtue of their pre-FIN 46 privileged access to information.
Investigating diverse reactions of different sets of market actors to an accounting standard change (such as FIN 46) and to subsequent changes in financial statements content is of interest and it contributes to our understanding of the role of accounting information in changing beliefs and decisions. Our study complements and extends the examination of FIN 46 effects on aggregate market metrics (Callahan at al, 2006) in that it informs about the workings of different segments of the market. 2 Documenting how 2 Examples in recent literature that address accounting effects on different market publics include Ke, Petroni, and Yu, 2008 who assess the impact of Reg FD on the abnormal selling of stocks by transient institutional investors even though other studies examined the effect on the market as a whole; Hope and Thomas, 2008 who investigate the effect of SFAS 131 on the excessive growth of foreign operations of firms even though other studies examined the accounting events differentially affect beliefs or decisions of various segments of the market conditional on different information sets they likely process is of interest to understanding the effect of existing information endowments on the assimilation of new accounting information.
We infer the first set of information users' perceptions of risk by observing two measures. Within the equity markets we examine: (1) the characteristics of analyst forecasts and (2) the earnings response coefficient, which, among other things, reflects the assessment of the risk that is manifest in financial statements measures. With respect to the second set of financial statement users, lending banks and rating agencies, we examine as a measure of perceived risk: (3) the spreads required by banks on private loans and (4) the ratings of securities by credit rating agencies. We examine two significant break points related to the disclosure of VIE information and the promulgation of the new guidance. First, we consider whether the perception of risk changed subsequent to 2001 to capture the effects of accounting scandals, the expectation of a change in accounting guidance, the increased press coverage and voluntary firm disclosures. Second, we examine whether the perception of risk changed after 2003 to capture the effects of the implementation of both FIN 46 and FIN 46R.
Overall, we conclude that equity market participants adjusted their beliefs about the riskiness of FIN 46 firms in expectation of the mandated disclosure and the consolidation of VIEs (but not upon the actual implementation of the new guidance). Specifically, we find that financial analysts experienced a reduction in the idiosyncratic precision of information relied upon, consistent with the argument that FIN 46 reduced analysts' incentives to gather private information. We also find that overall equity market participants acted as if they perceived higher business or informational risk as evidenced by reduced earnings response coefficients after 2001 for FIN 46 firms. On the other hand, we find that sophisticated information users that likely had access to information regarding the off-balance-sheet debt structures prior to publicly mandated disclosures do not exhibit a similar increase in risk assessment either in expectation or with the adoption of FIN 46. Specifically, we find that banks did not increase the loan spreads for FIN 46 firms at a greater rate than the spreads for other firms and credit rating agencies did not lower the ratings of these firms more than the ratings of other firms. This finding is consistent with our conjecture that these entities were aware of the true risk levels of FIN 46 firms even under the prior limited disclosure regime.
effect on the market as a whole; and Berger and Hann, 2003 who examine, among other things, the effect of SFAS 131 on analysts' forecast accuracy.
Overall, we conclude that the perceived risk of firms that have structured a part of their operations in separate entities increased significantly after they became likely to be required to bring in the previously off-balance-sheet assets, liabilities, and results of operations into their financial statements.
We interpret these results as evidence that, to the extent these firms assumed responsibility for the liabilities of the separate entities, they have successfully withheld information from the market by hiding their debt previously and that relative to their peers were associated with lower risk within the equity market. We conclude that FIN 46 was instrumental in changing the behavior of market participants who lacked prior access to relevant information, namely equity investors and analysts.
The rest of this paper is organized as follows. The next section reviews the accounting guidance and the relevant literature as well as motivating our hypotheses. The third section describes our sample selection procedures and the sample. The fourth section presents and discusses our empirical results and the final section concludes. 1) the VIE does not have sufficient equity investment at risk;
2) the equity investors lack essential characteristics of a controlling financial interest;
3) the equity investors have disproportionate voting and economic interests.
The first condition to avoid consolidation requires that the VIE be able to finance its activities without additional subordinated financial support from any parties. The quantitative benchmark for sufficiency is set to be at least 10% of the VIE's total assets, but supplementary qualitative analysis to determine sufficiency is encouraged. 7 The second condition mandates that the holders of equity have the rights to make significant operating decisions, are obligated to absorb the losses of the VIE and have the right to receive the expected residual returns. 
Literature and Hypothesis Development
The literature discussing FIN 46 and FIN 46R has been largely limited to practitioner oriented implementation aids. See for example Ciesielski and Soroosh, 2004 , Agosta, 2004 and Reinstein et al. 2005 . Several papers present notable exceptions but are limited to specific types of assets or structures. difficult to disentangle any potential changes in the latter from the observed changes in the former. As we do not limit our sample to select off-balance-sheet structures examined in prior literature, but rather examine all instances of consolidation disclosures, we believe that the perceived risk changes will be driving the results. Also, to the extent that firms decreased their use of VIEs in reaction to FIN 46 and FIN 46R, their actual risk, in fact, would have decreased, thus biasing against us finding our hypothesized increase in perceived risk. Furthermore, our examination of both banks and credit rating agencies, whose information set likely changed much less than that of other participants, will allow us to better understand whether the results are driven by changes in risk characteristics or perceptions.
A large body of finance literature going back to seminal papers of Fama and MacBeth, 1973 and Merton, 1973 establishes that firm risk has essential capital market implications. In turn, much accounting research has examined the capital market impact of disclosures of various risk-related characteristics (for example Dechow et al. 1996 illustrate the impact of earnings management disclosures). While there is limited existing literature addressing the new VIE guidance, we can rely on a range of prior studies to formulate our hypotheses regarding the behavior of various capital market participants in response to the new consolidation requirements. VIEs enable a company to remove underperforming or risky assets and debt from its balance sheet, thus, allowing it to benefit from a lower cost of capital. However, explicit or implied performance guarantees may essentially keep the risk of the venture with the sponsoring firm.
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If these vehicles are not disclosed in the financial statements, then capital market participants are not able to accurately estimate the company's risk profile -an example of this is, of course, Enron which created and hid over 3,000 off-balance sheet vehicles. 11 The disclosure of retained risks of VIEs will reveal a presumably greater than previously thought level of company risk and the market will adjust its behavior accordingly. For example, Niu and Richardson, 2006 find that for firms that disclose their off-balancesheet securitization information, the off-balance sheet debt is treated by the capital markets in the same way as on-balance sheet debt in the determination of systematic risk. Under the new FIN 46 and FIN 46R
guidance the explicit and implicit risks of off-balance-sheet structures are revealed as the company acknowledges that the economic structure of the VIE is such as to warrant consolidation. Thus, we expect that the disclosure of consolidation information, or expectation of such consolidation, will evoke significant reaction from the capital market. Below we formulate specific hypothesis regarding the four market participants/effects examined.
10 See Gorton and Souleles, 2005 for a discussion of implicit recourse. 11 In addition to VIEs firms use other vehicles to structure financing that avoids recognizing assets and liabilities on their financial statements. This includes research and development limited partnerships, leasing transactions, asset securitizations, throughput arrangements, etc. Prior research has shown that use of these structures can lead to lower leverage, higher reported earnings, and avoidance of debt covenant violations among other effects (see Shevlin, 1987 and Beatty et al. 1995 for examination of R&D financing organization, and Mills and Newberry, 2005 for analysis of off-balance sheet and hybrid debt financing).
Prior research has found that analysts are not sophisticated in adjusting financial statements for off-balance sheet items -for example, Hirst et al. 2004 show that commercial bank equity analysts are able to analyze banks' exposure to interest rate risk when the fair value gains and losses on all financial assets and liabilities are recognized in financial statements but not when they are only disclosed in the notes to the financial statements (but not recognized in income). Thus, we expect that revelation of relevant VIE consolidation information is both new to financial analysts, and is difficult to impound in valuation. 12 Prior literature shows that in general disclosure of relevant information leads to more accurate forecasts Lundholm, 1996, Hope, 2003) . However, it has also been shown that disclosure of difficult information which complicates the forecasting or valuation process reduces analyst precision Stanford, 2005, Frankel et al. 2006) . Anticipation of the application of FIN 46R, and not knowing what the ultimate effect might be, would make earnings more difficult to forecast. As many commentators responding to the 46R exposure draft noted, the criteria for consolidation and the computations necessary to apply them are highly complicated and subjective. The ambiguity surrounding the precise quantum of risk to which the enterprise is exposed as a result of involvement with VIEs as disclosed under the Interpretation would be expected to render the analysts' task more difficult -leading to reduced accuracy. That is, if VIE consolidation disclosures are difficult to process, as indicated, we will observe a decrease in the analyst forecasting ability. Our hypothesis in null form regarding the behavior of equity analysts is as follows:
Hypothesis 1a : The precision of equity analysts following FIN 46 firms will not change under the new consolidation guidance (or in anticipation of it).
Prior research has frequently used returns-earnings relations to investigate the weight attached to financial accounting items. Empirical tests in such studies are often based on comparisons of earnings response coefficients (ERCs), which are slope coefficients from regressions of unexpected returns on unexpected earnings. The rationale is that firm values are equal to the present values of their expected dividends and present values are based on firm-specific discount rates, which are increasing in systematic risk and/or informational risk. Easton and Zmijewski, 1989 and Collins and Kothari, 1989 use the dividend discount model to show that when unexpected earnings cause corresponding revisions in expectations, ERCs are decreasing in systematic risk. Because FIN 46 elicits consolidation and/or disclosures regarding risks not revealed by firms previously, capital market participants that did not have privileged access to firm information prior to FIN 46 are hypothesized to heighten the discount rate and to attach lower weight to earnings surprises. We expect this because of the information risk associated with the ability to interpret disclosures or anticipated disclosures in a way that can lead investors to forecast as reliably as in prior periods when they did not suspect the existence of VIEs. Our hypothesis in null form regarding the earnings returns relationship is as follows:
Hypothesis 1b : ERCs will not change for FIN 46 firms under the new consolidation guidance (or in anticipation of it).
Both of the above hypotheses deal with market participants who prior to the promulgation of FIN 46 did not have detailed knowledge of VIE activities. However, several participants in the capital market are likely to have had significant knowledge due to unique relationships with sponsoring institutions.
Such participants examined below are commercial banks and credit rating agencies.
A large body of finance literature indicates that banks possess superior information due to an existence of unique lender-borrower relationships (e.g. Leland and Pyle, 1977 , Fama, 1985 , Campbell and Kracaw, 1980 Lummer and McConnell, 1989, and Allen, 1990 . See Boot, 2000 for a survey of this literature). Banks obtain information about the company at the loan initiation and initial screening and subsequently they have the ability to monitor both the firm performance and management's behavior over the duration of the loan. Such access to proprietary information means that banks know more about a company's prospects than other stakeholders. Yu, 2007 finds evidence that banks have superior information even when the public information environment of borrowers is rich and that this superior information is obtained through more efficient ex ante private information production. Consistent with prior literature we do not expect to reject the following null hypothesis:
Hypothesis 2a : Bank loan spreads will not change for FIN 46 firms under the new consolidation guidance (or in anticipation of it).
Relationships also play a critical role in the activities of other financial intermediaries. Jorion et al. 2005 provides evidence that credit analysts at rating agencies have access to confidential information that is not available to other securities professionals. Earlier research on the information content of rating agency announcements has shown that downgrades have a significant impact on daily stock prices, indicating that rating agencies, at least in some instances, are leading the market in information procurement. (Holthausen and Leftwich, 1986; Hand et al. 1992; and Dichev and Piotroski, 2001 ). In the context of offbalance-sheet assets and liabilities, there is evidence that the rating agencies were explicitly concerned with the disconnect between economic substance and legal form of transactions before the promulgation 
Data and Descriptive Statistics
To obtain our sample of firms we carried out an automated search using the SEC's Electronic Data Gathering, Analysis, and Retrieval (EDGAR) system. We searched 10-K filings of all US firms from relevant portions of these filings were read and analyzed and each filing was assigned to one of the following six categories: (1) 46 or 46R are discussed and the disclosure indicates or implies that appropriate consolidation was carried out; (2) it is specified that the firm intends to adopt 46 or 46R and expects some impact from consolidation; (3) 46 or 46R are discussed but the effect on the firm is specified to be minor and few details are provided; (4) 46 or 46R are discussed and the disclosure indicates or implies that appropriate deconsolidation was carried out; (5) 46 or 46R are mentioned but the disclosure specifies that the guidance does not apply to this firm or that the impact is immaterial; and (6) 46 or 46R are mentioned but the disclosure specifies that the firm is still assessing any impact, with no other details provided. 13 See Appendix B for examples of disclosures in each of the six categories. Of interest to us are category 1 and 2 disclosers, firms revealing actual or expected substantial impact resulting from the adoption of new consolidation requirements. The firms in these categories (1 or 2) that form our sample must have deemed the events disclosed as material: otherwise they would not have needed to consolidate or disclose.
14 The examples of category 1 disclosures in Appendix B illustrate the 13 In instances when the firm disclosed both material consolidation and deconsolidation the firm was classified as a category 1 discloser. Table 1 for the full distribution of identified filings among the six categories.
Panel B of Table 1 shows the distribution of the full set of filings by the fiscal period of the report. We observe that the filings are not clustered in any particular period. As expected, we observe that category 6 filers (those still assessing the impact) are mainly concentrated in the earliest period. In fact, ARB 43, addressing the authority of opinions, states in paragraph 9: "The committee contemplates that its opinions will have application only to items material and significant in the relative circumstances"
Panel D of Table 1 
Equity Market Participants
The two tests within this section seek to examine whether equity market participants adjusted their beliefs about riskiness of FIN 46 firms subsequent to the accounting scandals of early twenty first century and the accounting guidance that was promulgated in response.
Equity Analysts
We employ a difference-in-difference approach using a matched sample in that we examine whether the different dependent variables we focus on change for FIN 46 firms in a systematically occurring during the same period. We construct the matched sample by picking the firms that are closest in size and book to market to the sample firms in the Fama-French 48 industry in the same year but which did not make any FIN 46 disclosures.
We examine two characteristics of analyst forecasts: the estimated precision of public and private information relied upon. These measures are rooted in the fact that forecast dispersion reflects the quality of private information, errors in individual forecasts reflect the quality of both public and private information, and the errors in the consensus estimates mainly reflect the quality of public information.
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The anticipation of the information to be provided by the implementation of FIN 46 is likely to have depressed the analysts' incentives to gather information prior to the FIN 46 disclosures. This, in turn, would decrease the precision of private information. The effect of actual implementation of FIN 46 on private precision is ambiguous and it depends on whether the public disclosure encourages or discourages the acquisition of more precise private information. Hence, we cannot predict a particular directional effect of the implementation of FIN 46 on the precision of private information. We also offer no predictions regarding the change in the precision of public information either in anticipation or upon implementation of FIN 46. The precision of public (common) information reflects the extent to which analysts rely on the public information in generating their forecasts. While greater levels of disclosures may contribute toward increasing the precision of public information, if the FIN 46 information is difficult to interpret it may in fact have decreased it.
We obtain our analyst data from the Institutional Brokers Estimate System (I/B/E/S). We use information from the detail databases and focus on quarter forecasts of earnings per share. We calculate the Barron et al. 1998 measures of precision or quality of common and idiosyncratic information using the detail files (as done in prior literature) as follows:
SÊ is the signed forecast error squared scaled by the absolute value of the actual EPS (where the forecast error is the actual EPS minus the mean of individual forecasts in the 90 days prior to the earnings announcement). D is the variance of the individual forecasts scaled by the absolute value of the actual EPS, and N is the number of analysts covering the firm. To calculate these measures we use all individual forecasts made in the 90 days prior to the announcement of quarterly earnings (retaining the latest forecast for each analyst). We winsorize common and idiosyncratic precision variables at 1% to eliminate the effect of extreme outliers.
We estimate the following regression using OLS with both analyst characteristics (Common Precision and Idiosyncratic Precision) described above as dependent variables: either reduced analysts' incentives to gather private information or caused whatever private information 16 Using market capitalization to define Size, and Net Income to define Loss does not change the results.
about future income is acquired after FIN 46 implementation to be noisier Interestingly, we find no evidence that precision of private information is further reduced for these firms upon implementation of FIN 46 or that precision of public information is reduced for FIN 46 firms upon either the anticipation or the implementation of the guidance (in all three instances we see a decrease in precisions albeit not statistically significant).
Earnings Response Coefficient Analysis
We obtain all data for ERC analyses from CRSP, Compustat and I/B/E/S data files. or 2 discloser per our classification). Beta is calculated from the 1 factor model regressing stock return on just the market return, both adjusted for the risk-free rate, using the monthly data from the 5 preceding years (using the 3 or 4 factor model does not change the results). Size is the lagged log of market value of equity and MB is the lagged ratio of market to book value of equity. Per Teoh and Wong definitions, the Beta, Size and MB variables are all converted into dummy variables representing observations below and above the median in a given fiscal year. Prior literature has shown that the security price responses to unexpected earnings are non-linear. More specifically, because the absolute value of unexpected earnings is negatively correlated with earnings persistence the response coefficients on extreme positive and negative surprises will be of much smaller magnitude (Freeman and Tse, 1992) . Correspondingly, we carry out the OLS regression above on a modified sample of observations, where we excluded the observations with unexpected earnings in the top or bottom decile (ranking performed within each fiscal year). Additionally, prior literature has shown that observed ERCs may be artificially lowered due to measurement error in the proxies for the earnings expected by the market (Bartov et al. 1999 ).
Correspondingly, we include a measure of dispersion of analyst forecasts as an independent variable (not 
Other Information Users
The two last tests within this section seek to examine whether other (non-equity-market) sophisticated information users adjusted their beliefs about riskiness of FIN 46 firms subsequent to FIN 46 implementation and in anticipation of it.
Bank Loan Analysis
The initial list of our sample consists of all publicly traded firms regardless of whether they have The following equation is estimated using a two-step Heckman Selection Model (see Li and Prabhala, 2007 for an excellent discussion of the impact of self selection on corporate finance decisions, and Kim et al. 2006 for the application of a self-selection model to auditor characteristics and bank loans): (3) and (4) represents the selection model. We include firm specific variables that likely affect the decision to borrow from a bank as well as the spread charged by the banks. We include firm-specific risk characteristics such as Beta, Size (decile of company market value), Market to Book ratio and prior years' Leverage (ratio of long term debt to total assets) to capture the contribution of these factors to spread.
21 These firm-specific characters are also likely to affect the decision of the firm to borrow from banks. Therefore, we use the same firm-specific characteristics in our selection equation (Equation (4)).
We hypothesize in 2a that β 4 =0 and β 5 =0, i.e. that bank spreads will not change for FIN 46 firms after 2001 or after 2003. Table 4 presents the estimation results of equations (3) and (4) Previous research on bank loan contracts shows that several loan-specific characteristics are related to the interest rate charged by banks (e.g. Strahan, 1999; Dennis et al. 2000; Bharath et al. 2006 , Kim et al. 2006 . Therefore, we include in equation (3) a set of loan-level variables to isolate the potential effect of loan characteristics on the loan spread from the effect of our test variables. The Loan Maturity variable is the log of the loan maturity period in months. The Loan Size variable is the amount of loan facility given to a borrower. Bae and Goyal, 2003; Bharath et al. 2006 show that banks charge a higher interest rate for a longer-term loan and for a smaller loan facility. This suggests that the expected sign of Loan Size is negative and of Loan Maturity is positive. Syndicate is a binary variable which is equals 1 if the loan is syndicated. If the interest rate charged off the syndicate and non-syndicate loans is significantly different, this variable would capture the difference.
We also include Loan Purpose, Loan Type, Year, and Fama-French 48 Industry fixed effects in our specification. Including these fixed effects helps us rule out the possibility that unobserved loan purpose, loan type, year, and industry characteristics drive our results. We include two more dummies to capture the impact of previously documented important factors such as performance pricing and number of lenders. Performance Pricing is a binary variable which is equal to 1 if the loan contract includes performance pricing options and Number of Lenders is the number of lending banks for each loan facility.
Loan Type dummies are based on term loans, revolvers greater than one year, revolvers less than one year and 364-day facilities loans.
In Panel B of Table 4 , we report the results obtained using two different samples. The first sample includes all firms with sufficient data. The second sample contains the FIN 46 firms as well as firms that are closest in size and book to market in the same Fama-French 48 industry in the same year but which did not make any FIN 46 disclosures. In constructing the second sample, we require the matched firms to have bank loan data, which effectively removes the selection criteria. Hence the matched sample result is estimated using OLS.
For both samples, we find that estimated coefficients for After2001*FIN 46 and After2003*FIN 46 are not statistically significant after controlling for many loan and firm characteristics that are shown to be important for spread determinants. This result suggests that borrowing costs of FIN 46 firms did not change in the new environment differently from borrowing costs of other firms. We may infer that banks were aware of the fundamental risk characteristics of FIN 46 firms earlier than equity market participants.
Additional analysis (not tabulated) indicates that FIN 46 firms are more likely to access the bank debt market than the seasoned equity offerings market. We conjecture that since these firms are more likely to borrow from banks their risk is better perceived (or can be better investigated) by banks. The revelation of off-balance-sheet debt structures does not impact bank spreads, since banks were aware of the overall debt structure of the firms previously (due to relationship banking etc). Our results are in line with the prior literature's evidence of banks' superior knowledge.
Credit Rating Analysis
We use credit ratings issued by the four rating agencies that issue ratings as reported by FISD: 
In this specification, the left hand side variable is an inverted credit rating rank (1 is the poorest rating; 23 is the best rating). The After2001 (After2003) dummy variable takes a value of 1 when an observation belongs to calendar years starting from 2002 (2004) . The 46R dummy equals 1 if the firm is a category 1/2 discloser per our classification. Our null Hypothesis 2b predicts that β 4 =0 and β 5 =0, i.e. that security credit ratings will not change for FIN 46 firms after 2001 or after 2003. We include firm specific risk characteristics such as Beta, Size (decile of company market value), Market to Book ratio and prior years' Leverage (ratio of long term debt to total assets) to capture the contribution of these factors to rating. 22 In Panel A of Table 5 , we provide the sample statistics of variables used in the specification.
We included year and industry dummies Industry classification) to capture any year or industry credit rating spread variation. Huber/White Robust standard errors of estimates are provided below the estimated values, where the errors are clustered at firm level. We report the results in Panel B of Table 5 . We find that for both the full and the matched sample the estimated coefficient for After2001*FIN 46 is not statistically significant. After2003*FIN 46 is statistically significant in the full, but not the matched sample. This generally suggests that that the rating agencies possibly had access to some information about off-balance-sheet financing of FIN 46 firms in the earlier period and, thus, did not change their ratings as a result of FIN 46 disclosures or in anticipation of such disclosures. The saga of consolidation is ongoing and it promises to provide a rich menu for future research "thanks" to the unfortunate sub-prime mortgage crises that recently engulfed the markets. Currently, FASB is debating the further expansion of the set of entities that should be consolidated. For example, Qualified Special-Purpose Entities would no longer be automatically excluded from the requirement to consolidate as is now the case under SFAS 140 (FASB 2000) . And new qualitative criteria may well require the consolidation or disclosure of special-purpose entities with respect to which an enterprise has "implicit" or "reputational" risk 24 . If FASB requires such consolidation, "implicit" liabilities that manifest "reputational" risk would be reflected as liabilities in the financial statements of the enterprise. In light of our findings in this paper, this would likely increase the perceived risk and the manifestation of such risk 24 In a June 4, 2008 news item, Reuters reports: "Banks that sponsor asset backed securities may soon have to tell investors about the risks involved in deals they put together, even if the risks are only to their reputations, members of the Financial Accounting Standards Board said at a meeting on Wednesday". The article also illustrates the gravity of the risks: "Last year, for example, Citigroup Inc took $49 billion of structured investment vehicles onto its balance sheet, when few investors had been aware of their existence just six months before". Reuters quotes FASB member Leslie Seidman to say: "If you're a sponsor, presumptively you've got reputational risk, so tell us about the deals you've done".
(decreased weight attached to earnings). A very difficult but interesting question for future research will be to investigate whether such potential expanded consolidation rules are welfare enhancing. Specifies when to treat a particular asset of a VIE as a separate VIE; specifies that even an entity hitherto profitable will have expected losses and thus is subject to an evaluation; provides guidance on determining whether the equity investors lack direct or indirect ability to make decision through voting or similar rights (largely retaining qualitative approach). Reinforces the requirement of entities to consider in application of FIN 46R the existing implicit variable interests (implied pecuniary interests in an entity that changes with changes in the fair value of the entity's net assets exclusive of variable interests). Unlike explicit variable interests, which entail direct absorption or receipt of the variability of the entity, implicit interests deal with the same absorption or receipt but via indirect paths. Due to diversity in practice, judgment calls remain necessary in the application of this position.
4/13/2006 : FASB Staff Position FIN 46-R-6
Specifies the various variabilities to be considered in application of FIN 46R (such as cash flow variability and fair value variability) and provides guidance on the determination whether certain instruments create or absorb variability.
5/11/2007 : FASB Staff Position FIN 46-R-7
Clarifies the application of FIN 46R to investment companies. Size is the decile rank of the firm in the prior year. MB is the ratio of market value of equity to book value (data 60) in the prior fiscal year end. Leverage is the ratio of long term debt (data9) to total assets (data6) in the prior fiscal year. Maturity is the natural log of the loan maturity period (in months). Performance Pricing is a dummy variable which is equal to 1 if the loan contract includes performance pricing options. Syndicate is a dummy variable that equals 1 for the syndicate loans and 0 otherwise. Number of Lenders is the number of lending banks for each loan facility. Deal Amount is measured by the amount of loan facility given to a borrower. Standard errors clustered at firm level are reported in parenthesis . ***, ** and * shows statistical significance at 1,5 and 10% level respectively. 
